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**BUILDING RESILIENCE IN THE TIMES OF THE
COLD WAR: MOTIVES AND GEOGRAPHY OF
YUGOSLAV AND SOVIET MIGRATIONS
IN 1946 – 1989**

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ABSTRACT

Based on the synthesis of the review of scholarly literature, interviews, and autoethnography, this paper compares (e)migration from former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union during the Cold War, exploring the motives, forms, and geography of migrations, and types of Yugoslav and Soviet migrant communities. Major contributions of the chapter are twofold: first, it reveals migration flows and their forms between former socialist countries and between them and third world countries that were overlooked by the mainstream migration literature. Second, based on the analysis of migrant communities, the concept of mid-nations is developed in the chapter.

Key words: motives and geography of (e)migration, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, Cold War, migrant communities, mid-nations

Building Resilience in the Times of the Cold War: Motives and Geography of Yugoslav and Soviet Migrations in 1946 – 1989

Sanja Tepavcevic

Introduction

We usually went to Trieste for shopping. Once I bought one pair of Levi's jeans for me, and two more I wearied over to smuggle and sell when I return home to Yugoslavia. When I came back home, I sold these two other pairs, and covered the costs of my own pair (personal conversation, Germany, winter 2000).

We could not travel abroad, but we travelled all across a huge country. We believed that we were so happy and satisfied, and we had no clue how unfortunate we actually were (personal conversation, Russia, summer 2007).

These quotes are from my informal conversations about traveling during the Cold War with my friends' parents of the same generation – both were born in the mid-1950s. The first was born and raised in Yugoslavia and moved to Germany after the collapse of Yugoslavia. The second was born and raised in the Soviet Union (USSR) and relocated from Ukraine to Russia about a decade before the collapse of the USSR. These two quotations vividly illustrate the differences in private freedoms, including possibilities for mobility of citizens of the two socialist multinational federations, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Despite restrictions, during the Cold War Soviets also emigrated from their country of origin. This paper analyzes and compares the motives and conditions under which Yugoslavs and Soviets (e)migrated.

It is led by the following questions: What motivated Yugoslav and Soviet citizens to (e)migrate during the Cold War? How these motives influenced trajectories of their migrations? In what ways have Yugoslav and Soviet migrant communities differed? How did (e)migration relate with resilience of Yugoslav and Soviet citizens? In answering these questions, the present chapter combines the information received from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources comprise of personal diaries, field research notes, personal communication and formal interviews with Yugoslav and Soviet emigrants. The secondary sources comprise of scholarly

literature on Soviet and Yugoslav migrations, document analysis, and analysis of mass and social media sources. Therefore, the methods of inquiry applied in this chapter represent the combination of autoethnography, document analysis, and the review of literature.

The complex comparative inquiry into Yugoslav and Soviet emigrations demonstrates that their paths differed in both forms and nature. Depending on particular period of the Cold War, emigration from Yugoslavia was predominantly opportunity-driven and took temporary character. Quite the contrary, emigration from the Soviet Union was simultaneously forced and heavily restricted by the Soviet authorities. As a result, the Soviet emigration came in a wide range of forms, from legal ethnic group emigration to terrorist hijacking of the planes. Consequently, Yugoslav and Soviet migrant communities emerged through and developed different forms of resilience.

The following section provides description of the methods of inquiry used to gather information analyzed in this chapter. It is followed by the theoretical and contextual frameworks for the analysis by situating the research questions into the broader literature about motives for emigration and describes the context and the main propositions about global migration during the Cold War. Section 3 is divided into two parts. The first part brings together the information from various sources about the patterns and geography of Yugoslav migrations, while the second part analyzes Yugoslav migrant communities in several national sites. Section 4 follows the same structure as Section 3 by analyzing first geography and patterns of Soviet emigration, and then Soviet migrant communities abroad. The last section provides comparisons of Yugoslav and Soviet modes of migration and migrant communities and concludes.

2.1. Autoethnography – note on methods of inquiry

As Adams, Ellis, and Jones (2017: 1) point out,

Autoethnography uses personal experience (“auto”) to describe and interpret (“graphy”) cultural texts, experiences, beliefs, and practices (“ethno”). ... Given the focus on personal experience, autoethnographers also describe moments of everyday experience that cannot be captured through more traditional research methods. Doing autoethnographic fieldwork allows what we see, hear, think, and feel to become part of the “field”.


When using autoethnography as major research method, positionality of the author is of a special importance. Being born as a Yugoslav citizen during the late years of the Cold War, I experienced and noted boundaries between Yugoslavs living in their country of origin (back then I belonged to that group), and Yugoslav migrants (parts of my family, family friends, and my friends). While in many respects these groups were overlapping in citizenship, origin, culture, educational level and background – in my social circles, experience of working abroad was considered at least as much appreciated professional soft skill. The kids of these professionals – my peers and friends, from whom I learned most about the life abroad, before I became an emigrant myself - usually had fluent or even close to native foreign language skills. In certain way, I remember to envy them for having friends from abroad: it was almost a privilege in a country, where foreigners were either tourists from the Western Europe, or Arabic and African students, thus they mostly were adults.

When in the early 1990s the war tore Yugoslavia apart, as a teenager I forcedly moved with my family to post-Soviet Russia, where I went through all stages of integration to the post-Soviet Russian society: from learning Russian from the beginner level, to working as reporter and anchor at the Russian television nine years after. Being both migrant and journalist, I spontaneously became a part of migrant communities in Russia, mostly in Moscow. Later, when I emigrated from Russia to Hungary, by the nature of my work, I became immersed in post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav migrant communities primarily in Hungary, but also all across the European Union (EU). My native knowledge of Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian and close-to-native knowledge of Russian made me an insider or an equal member of post-Yugoslav and post-Soviet migrant communities. That allows me to experience and understand in depth motives for migration and the choice of countries for immigration, borders of these communities, and their internal relations, as well as their approaches to the relationship between space and time, that all together *prosume* (simultaneously produce/generate, and consume/use) and constitute elements of resilience. As a result, I got first-hand insights from representatives of Yugoslav and Soviet migrant communities in geographic sites as diverse as West Germany, including West Berlin, Switzerland – Zurich and Bern, Austria – Vienna, the Soviet Union – Moscow, Vietnam, India – Calcutta, South Africa – Johannesburg, and USA – New York – to name few analyzed throughout this chapter.

2.2. Motives for emigration

Lee (1966) was the first scholar to propose the framework for the analysis of motives to relocate. His analytical framework comprises of four major groups of factors that shape motives for migration and volumes of migration: 1) factors associated with the area of origin, i.e. with home/sending country; 2) factors associated with the area of destination, i.e. with host/receiving country. Figure 2.1. graphically presents these groups of factors in in boxes 1 and 2 respectively.

Figure 2.1.: Framework for the analysis of motives for emigration



In this context and with regard to business cycles, Lee (1966: 53) suggests that “during periods of economic expansion ... the contrast between the positive factors at origin and destination is ... heightened, and the negative factors at origin seem more distressing”. Lee also rightly notices that factors influencing decisions related to migration can be positive and negative in both home and host countries. These are presented as + and – in boxes 1 and 2 in Figure 2.1. Therefore, Lee also outlines another two groups of factors influencing decisions related to migration: 3) intervening obstacles, such as migration-restricting laws and physical barriers – that are highly

relevant in exploration of the Soviet emigration – and; 4) personal factors, such as life cycle-related interests, or change of marital status. Figure 2. 1. graphically presents these two additional factors influencing migration-related decision-making in boxes 3 and 4. The same factors related to home and host countries can be interpreted as positive, negative or insignificant, depending on individual circumstances grouped under personal factors (possible combinations among groups of factors, thus, are marked by arrows in Figure 2.1.).

Starting from box 1 (lower right corner), negative factors in a place of origin that are most frequently analyzed by the literature are forced migration, most often regarded as caused by war (war refugees) and for political reasons that prompt search for political asylum. Still, within this group of factors is also dissatisfaction with economic situation, which prompts general search for a better life standard (Wilson and Portes 1980). Lee (1966) suggests that negative factors at a place of origin are usually combined with positive factors related to a place of destination (Figure 2.1., box 2 lower left corner). For instance, Portes (1997) point towards getting better payment for the same job and better career/professional opportunities than available in home countries.

Complementing Lee's analytical framework, Albert Hirschman's (1978) proposed another even more seminal framework for analyzing the motives for emigration. According to Hirschman (1978), dissenters, be they political or any other with a complaint, have two options: to voice their concerns or exit. In the case of 'voice', they criticize the government they are dissatisfied with. In case of exit, they leave the political community they are critical of (Hirschman 1970, 1978). Hirschman pointed out that one's loyalty towards the community in question determines the choice between these two options. Contributing to this Hirschman's claim in the context of authoritarian regimes, Burgess (2012) recognizes the third option – voicing after exit – or engagement in 'home politics' to promote change after leaving the country. Overall, both analytical frameworks implicitly consider emigration as resilience: while Lee's (1966) framework underlines social and economic aspect of emigration as resilience, Hirschman's (1992) framework points toward political aspect of migration as resilience.

2.2.1. World Migrations during the Cold War: Major Types/Propositions

In the period 1945 – 1970, two main types of migration led to the formation of new, ethnically distinct populations in economically advanced countries that simultaneously represent the main propositions about migrations during the Cold War.

- First type was migration of workers from the European peripheries to Western Europe usually through guest-work system: free movement of workers within the European Community became increasingly significant. The global oil crisis of the early 1970s brought economic recession soon followed by the period of the global economic restructuring, and, consequentially, by organized recruitment of manual guest workers by advanced industrial countries (Castles, Maas, and Miller 2018).
- Second, immigration of population from the former colonies to the European power centers. Starting from Germany and ending in the UK, the timing of these movements varied, but they both were followed by family reunion and “other kinds of chain and network migration” (Castles, Maas, and Miller 2018: 104).

Other types of world migrations in the Cold War period also included:

- Mass movements of refugees from Europe, most significantly from Germany and Poland to North America;
- (As colonies gained their independence) former European colonists’ return migrations to their countries of origin.

The following sections test these general propositions by exploring Yugoslav and Soviet migrations that also appeared within these timeframes and contexts.

2.3. Motives and Geography of Yugoslav migrations

In the late 1940s, the citizens of the former Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and state formation – Independent State of Croatia – that emerged and existed during the Second World War as protégé of the Nazi Axis – Germany, Italy, and Spain – collaborators with the forces of the axis, faced the arrests and prosecution for the war crimes. Most notably, these were remnants of “Croatia’s fascist Ustasha regime, who operated in the concentration camp in Jasenovac, known as the “Auschwitz of the Balkans”, a complex where about 600000 Serbs, Jews, and Roma were killed between 1941 and 1945 (Rotella and Wilkinson, 15 April 2003). Therefore,

many of them immigrated to the countries, where they could find a protection. For instance, having by that time numerous German, Italian and Spanish immigrant communities, Argentina under the Juan Domingo Perón's regime invited them there, "sending agents to Europe to ease their passage, providing travel documents, and in many cases covering expenses" (Minster, 4 April 2021).

Therefore, due to negative political circumstances in their country of origin, these remnants of the Yugoslav collaborators with Nazi governments of Germany and Italy were forced to emigrate – to exit – to avoid prosecution, and this emigration represented their political, social and physical resilience. Paradoxically, these Croats constituted the first post-World-War-II migrant community from Yugoslavia. Writing about the commander of Jasenovac, Dinko Sakic, journalists at the *Los Angeles Times* gave a general characteristic of this migrant community:

Sakic, the retired former owner of a textile factory, has left his home in the beach resort of Santa Teresita and apparently traveled to Buenos Aires, but technically he is not a fugitive ... Rather than keeping a low profile after he came to Argentina 50 years ago, the reportedly outspoken Sakic has been active in the sizable Argentine Croatian community. He traveled to Europe to espouse Croatian nationalist causes and boasted about having clout with Argentine politicians, according to Argentine officials and Jewish activists (Rotella and Wilkinson, 2003).

With fewer crimes on their shoulders during the WW II, remnants of the Serbian King's Army did not see their future in the socialist regime, and many of them moved and settled in South Africa.

Starting from 1948, when Yugoslav government under leadership of Josip Broz Tito refused to join the socialist bloc under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, and until its collapse in 1991, Yugoslavia was the only country with a socialist system in Europe, whose citizens could move freely across the borders. Apart from remnants of the collaborators with the European Nazi powers, emigration from Yugoslavia in the early aftermath of WW II was significant due to the difficult economic situation the country faced: destroyed infrastructure, poverty, and political reconstruction. As Bubalo-Zivkovic, Kovacevic, and Ivkov (2010) point out, "around 200,000 people who went to western European countries crossed the ocean" and went to the countries of traditional immigration of the 'new world' Ivkov (2010: 27). Therefore, these early post-

WWII Yugoslav migrations were one of the forms of Yugoslav citizens’ post-war socioeconomic resilience. This Yugoslav emigration wave ended by the 1950s, with the beginning of the country’s industrialization and economic restructuring. Table 2.1. displays the exact reported numbers of this further emigration of Yugoslav citizens from Europe.

Table 2.1. Reported numbers of emigration of Yugoslav citizens from Europe 1945 - 1985

Receiving country	USA	Canada	Australia	Argentina	Brazil	New Zealand
Reported number of Yugoslav immigrants	84000	30400	23350	15000	5000	560

Source: Bubalo-Zivkovic, Kovacevic, and Ivkov (2010)

These examples place early post-WW II Yugoslav migrations in the line with Castles, Haas, and Miller (2018) mass migrations from Europe to North America, but they also contribute with insight into emigration to the countries of South America and Africa.

In later post-WW II periods, significantly for Yugoslav citizens, borders remained visa-free not only to the Western Europe, but also to the countries of the Socialist bloc, and later, to the newly decolonized African and Asian states. On the one hand, the political leadership of the most of newly decolonized third-world countries together with Yugoslavia’s political leader Josip Broz Tito founded the Non-Alignment Movement, which in practice served as the third, though weak, bloc in the bipolar world system. Still, in contrast to other non-aligned countries during the Cold War.

Yugoslavia’s non-alignment was neither a product of anti-colonial revolution nor of post-colonial defiance to former masters. It was a direct outcome of inter-bloc dynamics, where a country performing an authentic communist revolution – striving for independence and equality from both blocs – had completed an arduous political journey from the fringes of European bloc politics to the forefront of world politics where it was shaping a new ideological and foreign policy response to the existing dominant currents in international relations (Cavoski 2019, Wilson Center).

As a result, during the post-WW II period of economic and political restructuring, for the other members of the Non-Alignment Movement, Yugoslavia represented economically the most developed and the only member located in Europe. In the 1970s, Yugoslavia served as one of

the key sources of knowledge and technologies for developing industries of recently decolonized countries and for building their industrial and military infrastructures. Consequently, many Yugoslav engineering companies signed the project-based contracts with third world countries and sent there their professionals. For instance, Iraq was Yugoslavia's most important trade partner among the third world countries (Serbia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). In the mid-1970s, Yugoslav and Iraqi governments signed a large contract for building the deep-water port, Umm Quasr Port in Iraq (Gataric 2003). Similarly, in the 1980s, during Iraq's invasion on Iran, Yugoslavia was major exporter of weapons to Iraq (Environmental News 2013). Therefore, it was quite common among Yugoslav engineers, architects, and economists to move temporarily for work to Iraq for several consecutive years, and often to bring their families with them. As a result, at the beginning of the Iraq's invasion on Iran, about 100,000 Yugoslav citizens were evacuated from Iraq (Gataric 2003). Therefore, Yugoslav citizens' decisions to move temporarily to third world countries were entirely opportunity-driven: Yugoslav professionals' salaries for conducting these infrastructural projects were significantly higher than that they received by working at home. Additional important benefit was that they were paid in hard currency. All this allowed them socioeconomic upward mobility on their return to Yugoslavia.

Similarly, being the only socialist country outside the socialist bloc, for most governments and citizens of these countries, Yugoslavia represented a relatively free market and the place of the easiest access to some otherwise unreachable Western products and technologies. As a result, Yugoslav construction, trade, and technological companies and their employees used these as opportunities not only to earn better salaries than available at home: earning in hard currency in the places where the local currency was weak, they could enjoy upward social mobility simply by being a foreigner. At the same time, they benefited by boosting their savings. Apart from that, not many Yugoslavs could afford long trips abroad, so temporary migration was also regarded as a certain prestige. In certain cases, starting from 1964 when Yugoslavia became a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, an organization facilitating development of eastern European – socialist – countries, better known under the acronym COMECON, Yugoslav students used student exchange programs to study in some of other socialist countries. The most striking example was famous Yugoslav film director, Emir Kusturica, who described his experience of studying in Czechoslovakia in his memoirs under the title “The death is unverified gossip” (2010).

The situation in the countries of the Capitalist bloc was almost the opposite: being in need of labor because of rapid economic development, the governments of the Western Europe, including militarily neutral states, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, viewed Yugoslavs as cheap and relatively culturally close labor force. As a result, in the late 1960s, these countries signed bilateral agreements with several Southern European countries, including Yugoslavia, for sending guest work force. Based on these agreements signed between Yugoslavia as the sending country and Germany, Austria, and Switzerland (Bonifazi and Mamolo 2004; Kraler 2011) as host countries, Yugoslav medical doctors and nurses, blue-collar service providers, mostly construction workers, massively migrated as guest workers (Fibbi et al. 2015; Ivanovic 2019). Within the Yugoslav society, they became the class called *Gastarbeiter*, after the German expression meaning the guest worker. Over the 1960s, emigration – or temporal migration – from Yugoslavia to Western and Northern Europe reached around 1,150,000, but in the 1970s, the number of Yugoslav guest workers decreased to 650,000, while the number of family members joining them abroad increased (Bubalo-Zivkovic, Kovacevic, and Ivkov 2010).

In the 1980s, when the countries of the Western bloc entered the phase of technological revolution, Yugoslav scientists and researchers were also in demand as in the third world and socialist bloc countries. Each year around 30,000 Yugoslav workers were employed across the countries of the Western bloc (Bubalo-Zivkovic, Kovacevic, and Ivkov 2010). However, in contrast to the later, they received their salaries in local currencies and – as foreign guest workers from a less developed country than the receiving one – they enjoyed less favorable conditions than their fellow citizens working in third world countries. Finally, in the 1980s, some top managers of Yugoslav production companies, mostly representing relatively well developed in Yugoslavia furniture and car industries represented these companies in the USA, UK, France, Italy and the Netherlands.

2.3.1. Yugoslav migrant communities from Western Europe to the Third World

Concurrently, migration flows between Yugoslavia, and countries of Socialist and Capitalist blocs and the Non-Alignment member states followed the broader interests of their members, while also reflecting professional and personal motives of Yugoslav citizens to migrate. There were relatively significant migrations from Yugoslavia to the Great Britain; the 1991 census recorded 13,846 residents of England, Scotland and Wales who had been born in Yugoslavia

(Munro 2017). In Western Europe and USA, Yugoslavs created temporal communities, which were immersed with local professionals. Given increasing number of immigrants in these countries in general, Yugoslav communities formed an integral part of the wider immigrant societies, simultaneously mostly remaining segregated from the native population. Due to the specificities of political regimes and cultural norms in third world and socialist bloc countries, Yugoslav communities in these countries evolved as temporary professional communities.

Following the aforementioned bilateral agreements between Yugoslavia and several Western European countries for guest laborers, Yugoslav communities were most numerous in West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. As these agreements sent relatively cheap Yugoslav labor to rapidly developing Germany, Austria and Switzerland in the first place, this resulted in the emergence of working class migrant ghettos in some of key European cities. For instance, Vienna's Ottakring, a typical working-class quarter, was most populous district (Statistik Austria 2001), where even at the beginning of the 20th century there was a strong segregation between the city's bourgeois and aristocratic center and the peripheral districts. In the 1960s and 1970s, many Yugoslav guest workers moved into substandard dwellings in and around Ottakringer Straße (Mijic 2019). The aim of these guest workers "was not to emigrate but to quickly earn desperately-needed money" (Ivanovic 2019:138).

Those of us who came here as guest workers, mentally remained guests forever. They never perceived Austria as the place of their permanent residence. Every time when they travel to the Balkans, they say that they go home, though they spent longer period of their lives here, than in the Balkans (personal communication, fall 2021).

Guest worker remittances were especially important for households in economically less developed regions of Yugoslavia, was one of important sources of income. It was quite common that when a family, for example, planned to buy a car, or build a house, an adult family member went to West Germany, or to Austria to earn the needed amount over the course of a year or two. Therefore, positive factors – the economic opportunities – in the country of destination were their major if not the only motive to migrate. The first wave of immigration from the Balkans to West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland brought highly qualified engineers, doctors and dentists. This wave almost immediately was followed by an influx of seasonal workers (Jorio 2005). As the number of these economic emigrants was significant and it had also economic importance for Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav government organized cultural-

entertainment tours, making additional lucrative income generated from the Yugoslav economic emigration (Bakovic 2015). Therefore, Yugoslav migrants simultaneously enjoyed social upward mobility in their home country not only on return, but also already as guest workers, which was important additional motive to migrate. Yugoslav emigration to Western Europe had also significance for the Yugoslav internal and foreign policies, and in each decade it followed certain political goals, as Bakovic (2015: 354) rightly notices:

In the 1960s, the Yugoslav state, together with national radio stations and *Matica iseljenika* institutions, supported large and financially lucrative music tours based on folk music, the content and staffing of which were in accordance with the federal and multiethnic structure of the country. However, in the early 1970s, the state support shifted towards smaller-scale activities, in order to fight accusations of commercialization and to facilitate migrants' amateurism as a form of Yugoslav self-management being transplanted to a capitalist soil, presenting it as an inherently transnational phenomenon.

Furthermore, the migration experience opened new perspectives to the Yugoslav guest workers in Western Europe attracting their attention to ethnic business opportunities in and across the countries of their temporary residence. As Ivanovic (2019: 139) points out,

There were over 800,000 Yugoslav “guest workers” in West Germany in 1972, making them the largest community of foreign workers. Most of them were qualified workforce. A lot of them worked in the restaurant business before going abroad. Many wanted to open their own restaurants. The outcome was the popping up of Yugoslav restaurants during the mid-1960s, which was met with excellent response from the German public. As Yugoslav papers reported, there were more than five thousand restaurants and fastfood kiosks offering Yugoslav food at the beginning of the 1970s. According to their owners, the early 1980s saw over 350 restaurants in West Berlin.

As a result, these guest workers became the creators of Yugoslav cuisine, primarily in West Germany. This was their first attempt in entrepreneurship, emerging without the patronage of the Yugoslav government. This entrepreneurship, in turn, had enormous impact on Yugoslav migrant communities in Germany, but also in Austria, and Switzerland: arriving from a self-governing socialist country, many of them had the need to be independent and make a move

towards private businesses. As a result, they were leaving their workplaces in factories where they had pay and job security for the better prospect of remaining in West Germany. Not many of them understood the system and the language, nor had any previous entrepreneurial experience.

They did not know how to make menus, make procurements, or what to expect. They could not estimate whether their business would be profitable. It was a kind of adventure ...The restaurants were also often named after tourist destinations – “Dubrovnik”, “Opatija”, “Dalmacija”, “Makedonija Grill” – which was in accordance with Yugoslavia’s image as a “touristic paradise”.

(Ivanovic 2019: 140).

This means that the Yugoslav guest workers exploited the positive image of their country of origin for building their own small businesses. In turn, not only the Yugoslav migrant community emerged in West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland – which goes in the line with Castles, Haas, and Miller (2018) argument about emergence of ethnically distinct population in economically advanced countries, which were made up from guest workers, but they also formed a new transnational social class – the entrepreneurs. The regional and gender composition of this new class was diverse: being Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, Bosnians, and Montenegrins, Yugoslav guest workers were not only men, but, as Ivanovic (2019) points out, even a third of them were women. For these women, emigration represented first significant emancipatory step that changed their status in a patriarchal family; their second emancipatory step was to start their own business: to open small shops, restaurants, or even to try themselves in professions that were traditionally reserved for men.

I came to Germany as a guest worker. I married a German and, since my German was and still is very good, I decided to continue my studies there. ... The marriage did not go well, so I decided to leave my husband. Through the student employment service, I got a job as a cab driver, and it was sufficient to be financially independent while studying (personal communication, fall, 2017).

Taken together, all these factors that constituted Yugoslav citizens’ migration experience in Western Europe influenced the gradual change in their mentality towards better-organized and resilient group of individuals. At the same time, their fellow citizens in Yugoslavia noted these

changes as different/ non-Yugoslav and rather inconvenient set of informal norms and culture. For example, in Yugoslavia's socialist system the social norm was staying and eating for free at relatives in the city when coming from a village or province to major cities for study or for a medical check-up in major urban clinics. In the capitalist system of Western Europe, this free-lunch-culture was absent. As one of Yugoslav musicians recalled,

We were touring around Germany giving concerts for Gastarbeiters, but there was a last minute cancelation, and we were left without promised lunch and accommodation. Then one of the band members recalled that his relative owns the restaurant in the neighboring city, so we went there expecting that she will provide us with a dinner for free. When we arrived, the band member was told that he was his relative, as we expected, were offered a very nice table and food. However, after we finished the dinner, the waiter brought us an ordinary bill. As a result, we spent almost all our earnings for that dinner that was supposed to be free (personal communication, summer 2016).

This change in social norms made Yugoslav migrants resilient in Western Europe. The Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* were considered as a special community, a kind of mid-nation, distant from Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia, but not entirely Western European. They were called *Yugo-Schwab* – the title derived from the fact that most of them lived in German-speaking countries, or – in the case of Switzerland – in German-speaking cantons.

In sharp contrast to *Yugo-Schwabs*, Yugoslavs who temporarily migrated to other socialist countries and third world countries, together with other 'expats' created migrant communities mostly based on diplomats and representatives of foreign, including Yugoslav, companies. These communities also included their kids, who usually went to international schools, or to national schools organized by, or with involvements of the embassies. Used to feeling privileged as foreigners, Yugoslav youth in other socialist and in third world countries adapted a 'colonizer' approach towards the locals. In third world countries, this approach was a product of long-colonial history and attitude of the locals to foreigners as *a priori* more privileged people: in response, Yugoslav professionals and their families usually behaved as good 'colonizers'. I noted a story told by one of my peers, who lived in one of newly decolonized countries of East Asia: "I came home from the school, and I saw our gardener in my old favorite t-shirt. Being surprised, I looked at my mom, and she calmed me down saying that he needs that t-shirt more than I did" (personal notes, summer, 2001). Normally, Yugoslav migrant

communities were concentrated in diplomatic areas of the third world countries' capitals, where both their offices and residential houses usually were located. Unlike in Yugoslavia, where it was safe to let kids to go to school alone, in emigration in the third world countries, Yugoslav migrant professionals' kids were either picked from homes by the specially organized school buses, or escorted by company or embassy staff.

Despite working in a colonial power itself, the communities of Yugoslav migrant professionals in the Soviet Union had much in common with their fellow Yugoslav professional communities across the third world: they also lived in specially designated blocks of residential buildings. Security fences surrounded these blocks of residential buildings, and one could access them only with an invitation from a resident and by demonstrating valid personal documents. Normally, mini parks and playgrounds were located within the residential fence zones. There were also chains of supermarkets *Beryozka*, where only foreigners and the Soviet diplomats were allowed to purchase products. Being raised under the influence of brotherhood and unity, ideology of equality among the people heavily propagated among the Yugoslav society in Yugoslavia, when I arrived to early post-Soviet Russia, I was shocked to hear complaints about 'the Russians' – usually meaning the sum of the Soviet population – from the Soviet-era Yugoslav migrant community:

We are so unlucky to be brought here to live among the Russians. They are so grey, so boring. Those whose parents went to work in Spain or in Cyprus are much luckier to live among Spaniards and Greeks, who are always friendly and warm. Actually, anyone is more interesting than the Russians are. We are so unlucky to have to tolerate them (personal notes, summer 1994).

Finally and importantly, one of the most notable and numerous Yugoslav immigrant communities emerged in South Africa. Leaving the country because of the socialist regime, a group of officials and soldiers of the Serbian King's supporters settled mostly in Johannesburg, and in 1952 founded the Serbian Orthodox Church Saint Sava (*Glas Srbije* 31 December 2014). While integrating into the wider European colonial society of the racially segregated South Africa, these immigrants retained strong Serbian – and similarly to Croats in Argentina, strong anti-Yugoslav sentiments as part of their transnational Serbian-African identity (personal communication, spring 2019). Most of them resided in the central so-called 'cluster' of Johannesburg, Sandton, where until the end of Apartheid was reserved exclusively for whites,

i.e. the privileged population. As a result, along with their transnational identity, this 'whiteness' made up a significant – privileged – component of the Serbian migrant community identity in South Africa: living in luxurious villas with swimming pools, large gardens and servants, was a typical lifestyle for them. Table 2.2. summarizes motives for emigration from Yugoslavia during the Cold War and the typology of the Yugoslav migrants community.

Table 2.2. Motives for (e)migration from Yugoslavia, geography of emigration, and Yugoslav migrant communities during the Cold War

Motive of (E)migration/type of (e)migrants	Escape from prosecution/ Croats Nazi-collaborators; Serbs remnants of the king's supporters	Search for better life conditions/ former peasants, manual/industrial workers, and traders	Higher salaries in hard currency than available at home and upward social mobility	Student exchange within the framework of COMECON	Rapid earning as guest workers, upward social mobility after return to Yugoslavia	Upward social mobility by representing the company abroad
Period of (e)migration	1945- 1947	1945 – 1950	c.ca1968 – 1985	Since 1964	Since 1968	Since late 1970s
Geography of (e)migration	Argentina/ South African Republic, Brazil	USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand	Iraq, India, the Soviet Union	Countries of the socialist bloc	Western and Northern Europe, mostly West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland	USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Netherlands
Characteristics of the migrant community	Retaining anti-Yugoslav sentiments and national identity tied with religion, integrating among other European migrant communities, entrepreneurial	Retaining national identity tied with the religion, integrating with other immigrant communities, weakening ties with the country-of-origin	Temporal professional communities, building professional relations and friendships with other foreigners, having strong ties and dependence on the country of origin, mostly closed communities	Individuals, building professional and personal relations with local population and students	Mass migration guest workers – professional, but mostly blue-collar workers, many turning entrepreneurs	Business professionals

Overall, the insights into the emergence of Yugoslav migrant communities in countries of the socialist bloc and third world countries adds a new dimension to Castles, Haas, and Miller (2018) proposition about migration flows between newly decolonized/third world and economically advanced former power centers that has been overlooked by the mainstream theories.

2.4. Geography and Forms of Soviet Migrations

In sharp contrast to Yugoslavs, during the Cold War, Soviet citizens were not allowed to leave the country without the Soviet government's permission (Krasnov 1986; Polian 2004; Remennick 2012). Simultaneously, the Soviet government carried out massive repressions on the social and ethnic grounds. These included mostly Soviet Jews, Germans, Crimean Tatars, and Meskhetian Turks – whom the Soviet authorities were relocating from their places of origin to other parts of the Soviet Union to working camps. In response to this repression, these groups required the restoration of their ethnic minorities' rights. However, as Polian (2004: 222-223) wrote, they

have been carrying on a peaceful, organized and generally – regarding the fulfillment of key tasks – unsuccessful struggle. ... As far as Soviet Germans are concerned ... they see their total emigration to the FRG as the only alternative to restoration of the Volga German ASSR ... emigration to Turkey represents no feasible alternative for either Crimean Tatars or Meskhetian Turks.

When translating this situation into Hirschman's (1983) analytical voice-or-exit framework, it becomes clear that the 'voice' – peaceful protests – option did not soften the Soviet authorities' repressions; they tried to opt for an 'exit', which was also very restricted. Thus, simultaneous ethnic repressions and restrictions to emigrate resulted in informal linkages of solidarity, and clearly defined trajectories of emigration: once they were allowed to emigrate, Soviet Germans migrated to Germany, and the Soviet Jews migrated initially to Israel. Particularly, starting from the late 1970s, the Soviet Jews and their non-Jewish relatives sought to immigrate to Israel. However, coming to Israel, many of them encountered unexpected discrimination that prompted them to move on.

When we still lived in Tajikistan... Jews were regarded there as a minority. Thus, by moving to Israel, we hoped to become decent citizens of that country. However, it turned out that we are second-class citizens, because there is a division in Israel between ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’, and we were ‘blacks’. The ‘whites’ are European Jews, Ashkenazi. We – Central Asian Jews – are so-called Sephardic which in Hebrew it means “Spanish”, so we originate from Spain and Morocco. As a result, there is a major rabbi of Ashkenazi, and major rabbi of the Sephardic – this division is unpleasant. So these divisions also influenced my decision to move on (telephone interview, winter 2020).

Thus, according to my interlocutor, ethnic divisions and social segregation that were the major motives for most Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel continued, and to a certain extent sharpened in their historical homeland. Similar to my interlocutor, as Remennick (2012) and Toltz (2019) also point out, many of Soviet Jews first moved to Israel, and then to Western Europe and North America. Most of the Soviet Germans ‘repatriated’ to Germany in the early 1990s (Polian 2004; Remennick 2012). Therefore, although taking similar directions – to ‘historic homelands’ – these migrations represented the opposite form from Castles, Haas, and Miller (2018) general proposition about the return of colonialist from the former colonies to economically advanced power centers.

Apart from such ethnic emigration, there were also other forms of emigration from the Soviet Union. On the one hand, within the socialist bloc, there was the controlled, but widespread exchange of students and professionals. For example, student exchange and marriage-based immigration from the USSR to the Central and Eastern European members of the socialist bloc was quite widespread during the Cold War. As one of my Soviet immigrant interlocutors, who came to Hungary in the late 1970s, recalled:

Back then, there were many Hungarians, who studied in the Soviet Union and returned to Hungary, so did my husband and I went with him. ... Hydrology was very close to my expertise, and I got a job in the geological institute ... where I was very welcomed. Everyone spoke Russian there; I got a salary higher than my husband, who is Hungarian (telephone interview, April 2020).

This may constitute an important addition to the literature on migration during the Cold War.

On the other hand, after WW II, Soviet troops were located across the European members of the socialist bloc: in Czechoslovakia their number included about 85,000 Soviet citizens, in Hungary this number was about 60,000, while in (East) Democratic Republic Germany there was 500,000. The motives of Soviet citizens to work abroad were similar, though not the same, as for Yugoslav citizens: “Money was the constant source of worry, hurt, and envy. Soviet citizens viewed long-term foreign posting as an incomparable source of income, often enough to lay the foundation for a lifetime of good living back home” (Gessen 2012: 64). In this respect, the Soviet citizens did not regard the countries of the Soviet bloc as a ‘real abroad’:

East Germany ... was viewed as not quite foreign enough, by ordinary people as well as by Soviet authorities: salaries and perks there could hardly be compared with those in “real” foreign land, which is to say, a capitalist country. ... the government finally authorized small monthly hard-currency payments (the equivalent of about a hundred dollars) as part of the salaries of Soviet citizens working in Socialist bloc countries” (ibid).

Similar to Yugoslav engineers, between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, the Soviet engineers were also temporarily employed on industrial and infrastructural projects in the socialist bloc countries of South-East Asia. The *Tri An* Hydro Power Plant in Vietnam was one of the significant projects made with Soviet assistance in Asia (Ray, Yu-Mei 2010).

The Soviet migrant community, particularly in Vietnam, were mid-level professionals in character. Although these migrations were temporary, they were overlooked by the mainstream literature on migration during the Cold War, and – similarly to student exchange and marriage-based migration – that fits in the Lee’s (1966) analytical framework – represents another additional explanation of the global migration flows during the Cold War.

In contrast to the migrations between the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist bloc, migrations between the USSR and the western bloc were even more strictly controlled and much less frequent. Due to these strict restrictions and extensive repressions by the Soviet authorities not only on the ethnic, but also on social and political grounds, Soviet migrations to the West usually were permanent, and they came in a whole set of forms that were hardly imaginable to citizens of most other countries in the world.

The first form of Soviet emigration seemed voluntary and in the form of non-return. The Soviet emigration committee often allowed famous artists, sportsmen and scientists to travel abroad for participation in international tournaments and research. However, after conducting the research or sport task, they simply stayed abroad and applied for political asylum or accepted invitations to stay to work. Therefore, the Soviet government labeled them ‘non-returners’ and declared them ‘homeland traitors’ (Krasnov 1986). These, for example, included the famous cellist Mstislav Rostropovich and his wife, Galina Vishnyevskaya, who was an equally famous soprano opera singer. Rostropovich was inconvenient for the Soviet government as the famous musician who believed in and fought for democratic values, including art without borders and freedom of speech (Wilson 2007).

The second form of emigration was individual escape by the sea: examples include oceanologist Stanislav Kurilov, whose escape was so dangerous and unusual that even the Voice of America reported it. According to some journalists, Kurilov’s sister, who was married to the Indian citizen, went with her husband to India. From there they immigrated to Canada. This – having a relative abroad – was the Soviet emigration ministry’s official reason to refuse Kurilov’s request to travel abroad. Being a deep-water diving instructor at the Institute of Oceanology in Vladivostok, Stanislav Kurilov in 1974 found out that the *Sovetsky Soyuz* cruise will travel from Vladivostok to the equator and back – and Kurilov went on the cruise. When the boat approached the coast of the Philippines, Kurilov jumped into the ocean, and swam 100 kilometers in three days without food, water or sleep until he reached the Philippine island of Siargao. The Philipinos he met on the coast took him to the city of Cagayan de Oro in Mindanao, after which his escape was extensively covered in the international media. The Philippine authorities deported Kurilov to Canada, where he reunited with his sister and her family, and later received Canadian citizenship. Simultaneously, Kurilov was sentenced in absentia to 10 years for treason (Krasnov 1986). In Canada, Kurilov learned English working as a handyman in a pizzeria, but later his skills and knowledge paved the way for him back to marine research in Canadian and American companies. Later, he met his wife – a Soviet Jew, who lived in Israel, and moved with her to Israel, where he continued his scientific marine research (Gomberg 2018).

Similarly, in 1979, the 18-year-old waitress, Lilia Gasinskaya, escaped from another Soviet cruise liner in the Sidney Harbor “in a red bikini”, and swam for 40 minutes to the Australian coast, where she asked for political asylum (Krasnov 1986). Soon after, Gasinskaya became

known as the ‘red bikini girl’, whose “swam for freedom” – as her escape was dubbed by the Australian press. She received political asylum and instant fame. This almost instant political asylum fueled debates over queue-jumping refugees: in Australia, refugees from conflicts in Asia, with greater fears of persecution than Gasinskaya, were not extended the same welcome. Despite these debates and simultaneous appearance of Gasinskaya on the KGB’s wanted list (Krasnov 1986), she was allowed to stay in Australia and build her career as a model and DJ (Edwards, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 2010).

The third form of emigration from the Soviet Union was political exile prompted by the Soviet authorities. The Soviet government deprived many famous Soviet intellectuals from the Soviet citizenship and expelled them from the country (Polian 2004). Though not particularly large, this group of Soviet emigrants included famous names such as the natural scientist and Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov, novelist Alexander Solzhenitsin, and the poet Joseph Brodsky.

The fourth form was the most radical: there were several cases when individual Soviet citizens or a small group tried to hijack passenger planes on their inter-Soviet flights, and force pilots to fly to countries outside the socialist bloc. The most striking example was the escape of the Ovechkin family – Ninel Ovechkina and her 10 children – a famous Soviet music ensemble. On 8 March 1988, on their flight from Irkutsk to Leningrad, they sent a message through the stewardess to the pilot, and they tried to force their flight to change trajectory and fly to “any capitalist country, most preferably to England”. The pilot, however, landed the aircraft at a Soviet military airfield where it was stormed by the Soviet military and all the family members and several other passengers were killed (Lenta.ru, 8 March 2018). Within Hirschman’s framework of political dissent, examples three and four can be categorized as radical exits.

The last form was legal and a mix of professional and ethnic principles: starting from the late 1960s, Soviet scientists and artists were invited to US universities, and the late 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by significant migration outflows of Soviet Jews, Armenians and Germans from the USSR to Western Europe, the USA (Aron, 1991), Canada (Shvarts 2010; Remennick 2012), and Israel (Remennick 2012). Receiving Soviet permission to travel and emigrate required not only the submission of all existing Soviet documents that the state provided the citizens, but also long waiting periods and uncertainty in the government’s decision concerning individual applications (Remennick 2012). Therefore, those, who were lucky to receive such permission, only had the option to relocate permanently.

2.4.1. Soviet Migrant Communities abroad

The motivations and paths of Soviet emigrations generated three general types of Soviet communities abroad: the first type was comprised of the Soviet occupying troops across the socialist bloc countries of the Eastern Europe, including army and KGB officers, procurement servicers, community schoolteachers, and their families. The second type was comprised mostly of Soviet intellectuals and dissenters who were dispersed across the Western Europe and North America. The last type, to certain extent, overlaps with the second one: these were mostly ethnic-based communities of Soviet Jews and to a lesser extent of the Soviet Armenians.

The first type of Soviet migrant communities – those located in the countries of the former Soviet bloc – were largely introverted and locally concentrated groups. In the second half the 20th century, they organized hospitals, schools, clubs, and shops, where officers' spouses were working to fulfil their own needs (Tepavcevic, Molodikova, Ryazantsev 2020). As Gessen (2012) points out, one such community was in Dresden, East Germany, where the long-standing Russian political leader, Vladimir Putin, served.

The Putins, like five other Russian families, were given an apartment in a large apartment bloc in a little Stasi world: secret police staff lived here, worked in a building a five-minute walk away, and sent their children to nursery school in the same compound. They walked home for lunch and spent evenings at home or visiting colleagues in the same building. Their job was to collect information about “the enemy” which was the West, meaning West Germany and, especially, United States military bases in West Germany, which were hardly more accessible from Dresden than they would have been from Leningrad. ... Ludmila Putina liked Germany and the Germans. Compared to the Soviet Union, East Germany was a land of plenty. It was also a land of cleanliness and orderliness: she liked the way her German neighbors hung their identical-looking laundry on parallel clotheslines at the same time every morning. Their neighbors, it seemed to her, lived better than the Putins were used to. So the Putins saved, buying nothing for their temporary apartment, hoping to go home with enough money to buy a car. ...KGB staff in Dresden had to scrimp and save to ensure that at the end of their posting they would have something to show for it. Over the years, certain conventions of fragility had set in – using newspapers instead of curtains to cover the windows, for example. (Gessen 2012: 63-64).

In such conditions, wives of the Soviet secret agents usually did not work. Their husbands also never talked to them about their work. As some of my interlocutors told me, there were rare exceptions:

I adore my job of being a Russian language teacher, because I could always work everywhere. My husband was a secret KGB agent in East Germany, and I was the only wife who worked there, because I was a teacher at the community school. All the other women, who were all highly educated and smart, could not find their professional mission abroad, and remained only housewives and mothers. I remember simultaneous admiration and envy in their eyes, when they passed by me on my way to the school (interview, October 2021).

Their largest communities in Hungary were located in Budapest, Paks and Debrecen; in Milovice, Mlada Boleslav and Bruntal in Czechoslovakia, and in Dresden, Wunsdorf, and Magdeburg. Their livelihood activities were community-based and community-self-sustaining. However, the contacts with the local communities also brought them to a certain level of integration into the local societies and defined their own national identity.

I came to Hungary when I was seven. ... In the 1980s, I moved to Budapest to study ... I never could become Hungarian because of the Hungarians: they were constantly teasing me because I am Russian ... When I graduated, I got a job in a Russian logistics company and I travelled a lot between Hungary, Russia and Ukraine (immigrant from Ukraine, personal communication, May 2020).

Therefore, despite immigrating to Hungary as a child, some of the representatives of the Soviet migrant communities in the countries of the socialist bloc never felt completely socially integrated. In comparison to Soviet communities in the European socialist countries, Soviet professional migrant communities in Asia were composed mostly of male engineers, while their families stayed in the USSR. As my interlocutor who worked as an engineer in Vietnam recalled,

Occasionally, we travelled home to the USSR to visit families. My work was a major income for the family. ... In Vietnam, we lived close to the construction site, 80 km

from Hanoi. ... We went to Hanoi twice to see the city. The rest of the time we spent at the construction site. Our contacts with Vietnamese were limited to professional communication. I learned several key words in Vietnamese and earned enough to have an above average comfortable life back home (personal communication, Russia, summer 2011).

Where the Soviet migrant communities in countries of the socialist bloc, Yugoslavia, and third world countries were similar in terms of size, the Soviet professional community in Vietnam represented a rather small and closed community.

In Western Europe and North America, the Soviet migrant communities mostly grew from the Soviet no-returnees – the intellectuals and sportsmen, exiled Soviet artists, and Soviet ethnic communities – Jews, Armenians, and Germans. (Azrael et al. 1992). For example, when Joseph Brodsky was exiled from the Soviet Union, Mstislav Rostropovich and Galina Vishnyevskaya accommodated him in their place in New York City. This solidarity with compatriots expelled from the country-of-origin along with non-return became one of the major forms of resilience of these Soviet migrant communities composed of the Soviet intelligentsia. Similarly, Soviet ethnic-based migrant communities followed the family reunion paths, as was the case with Yugoslav guest workers in Western Europe.

After these 7 years in Israel we moved to Vienna, because we had a lot of relatives there. At the same time, the climate, friends, relatives – everything was much closer to us here in Austria, than in Israel. ... In Vienna, although there were wide-spread narratives about Austrian anti-Semitism, I have never seen or felt it – and I have been living here for almost 40 years. That is amazing!

However, as my interlocutor explained, in contrast with Yugoslav and other European guest workers in Western Europe, Soviet family reunions often resulted in further relocation, mostly from Israel to Western Europe or to North America. All these findings are summarized in Table 2.3. below.

Table 2.3. Motives for (e)migration from the Soviet Union, geography of emigration, and Soviet migrant communities during the Cold War

Motive of (E)migration/type of (e)migrants	Economic motives in the form of representation of the Soviet army or engineering company abroad	Search for professional, social, and ethnic freedoms in forms of non-return and escape	Ethnic discrimination and ethnic-based repressions
Period of (e)migration	Between early 1960s and late 1980s	1970s	Starting from early 1970s on (with periods of restriction)
Geography of (e)migration	Socialist bloc	Capitalist bloc countries	Israel, Germany, USA
Characteristics of the migrant community	Closed professional communities, living in small localities, where the life was organized around inter-community activities	Geographically dispersed professional communities of Soviet intellectuals, artists, sportsmen; to some extent overlapping with Soviet ethnic communities	Ethnic-based communities – Soviet Jews, Germans, Armenians

2.5. Comparisons and Conclusions: Yugoslav and Soviet Migrations and Migrant Communities

Despite striking differences between Yugoslavia's and the Soviet Union's migration policies, the goals of temporary migration, and treatment of their citizens abroad the analysis of migration motives and forms of emigration from the two former socialist multinational federations also reveals certain commonalities. These commonalities simultaneously provide an important theoretical contribution to the global picture of migrations during the early aftermath of WW II and the Cold War and, for this reason, deserve to be discussed before the differences. When putting emphasis in their foreign policies on relations with other socialist and the third world countries, both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were temporally sending their citizens – engineers, trade managers, soldiers, and intelligence and procurement services

providers abroad – to other socialist countries, some of which – like Vietnam – overlapped with third world countries.

Simultaneously, Yugoslav and Soviet citizens' motives for temporary work in such countries were socioeconomic. These included the search for higher salaries and consequentially prompter available savings than available – or even imaginable – in home countries and, related to this experience of work abroad, almost immediate social upward mobility, both in the countries of temporary residence, and back in the countries of origin. These Yugoslav and Soviet temporary professional relocations abroad were also an important resource of remittances for both Yugoslav and Soviet families. Another similarity, though much smaller in its scale among Yugoslav citizens compared to the Soviets, were the student exchanges within COMECON member states.

Another both theoretically and empirically significant similarity in temporary Yugoslav and Soviet migrations to other socialist and third world countries analyzed in this chapter was in separation – though not the segregation – of these migrant communities from the mainstream societies in host countries. As revealed in the previous sections, both Yugoslav and Soviet migrant communities perceived themselves as different from the mainstream societies, and put little to no effort into immersing themselves, let alone to integrate into these societies. As a result, they lived in their community 'bubbles'. Still, even in these countries, Yugoslav communities differed from their Soviet counterparts by being immersed into communities of other foreigners from the countries of the capitalist bloc. Therefore, while overall this type of motivation for migration corresponds to Lee's (1966) positive factors in the country of destination, it sheds light on migrations flows within the less researched former socialist bloc, and migration flows between it and third world countries during the Cold War. For its transnational nature, these migration flows for the first time systematically analyzed in the present chapter provide a new historical dimension to later migration theories of ethnic enclaves and transnationalism, whose first proponents were Portes and Wilson (1980) with their study of immigrant enclaves in the USA.

Although the differences in motives for migration from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are more visible, they also deserve to be discussed for their conceptual contributions. While 'exit' – in Hirschman's meaning – was the option only for remnants and supporters of the defeated during after WW II in Yugoslavia in the mid-1940s, this remained a major vision – though not

always available solution – for survival and a form of political and social resilience for many Soviet citizens during long Cold War decades. This led not only to differences in forms of emigration that were particularly radical on the part of Soviet citizens, as described in Section 3, but also resulted in very different forms and types of Yugoslav and Soviet migrant communities, especially in the countries of the former capitalist bloc. In general, escaping tyranny at home, the Soviets usually immigrated to the countries of the capitalist bloc by applying for political asylum or ethnic repatriation visas and accepting professional contracts in the US and Canadian, but also from Western European and Israeli research institutes and companies.

On the contrary, starting from 1968, Yugoslavs migrated mostly as legal and invited guest workers to Western Europe as a whole and later – in the late 1970s and 1980s – as representatives of Yugoslav companies and, as a result, emerged in significant numbers, as socioeconomically-motivated migrant communities, absolutely fitting the opportunity-driven positive factors in the receiving country in Lee's (1966) analytical framework. Their migrant-worker experiences in rapidly economically redeveloping countries of Western Europe influenced changes in their mentality and culture, most significantly in its economic aspect: many of them became entrepreneurs and started to envision interpersonal relations through the prism of economics, which was in striking contrast with their compatriots and family members who stayed in Yugoslavia. For this feature, Yugoslav migrant communities in Western Europe – predominantly in West Germany, Austria and Switzerland – emerged not merely as Yugoslav diaspora (as in other Western European countries), but as so-called *Yugo-Schwabs* an entirely new concept of a “mid-nation”: not anymore Yugoslav, but not yet German/Austrian/Swiss. These findings are summarized in the comparative Table 2.4. below.

Table 2.4.: Similarities and differences in Yugoslav and Soviet motives for (e)migration and migrant communities

	Yugoslav citizens (Yugoslavs)	Soviet citizens (Soviets)
Similarities between Yugoslav and Soviet motives and forms for migration	Socioeconomically motivated temporary migration to other socialist countries and the countries of the third world – mostly Soviet Union and Iraq	Socioeconomically motivated temporary migration to other socialist bloc countries – mostly Eastern Europe and Vietnam
Differences between Yugoslav and Soviet motives and forms for migration	Opportunities-driven legal temporary/guest-worker mass migration to Western Europe	Necessity-driven sociopolitical ethnic and social emigration mostly to USA, Canada, Israel, and Germany
Similarities between Yugoslav and Soviet migrant communities	In socialist bloc and third world countries – introvert communities	In socialist bloc countries – introvert communities
Differences between Yugoslav and Soviet migrant communities	Relatively large, geographically concentrated, well-connected, and coexisting with other migrant communities, usually connected with Yugoslav state institutions abroad	Locally concentrated ethnic communities, sometimes overlapping with geographically dispersed dissident/professional migrant communities, disconnected with any Soviet institutions

Finally, while these findings confirm the general propositions regarding migrations during the Cold War – mass migration of workers from the European peripheries to Western Europe, usually through the guest-worker system (Castles, Haas, and Miller, 2018), this concept of “mid-nation” represents the major conceptual contribution of the present research for further studies of global migrations. One of these avenues for further research is how these migrant communities experienced and obtained skills that served Yugoslav and Soviet citizens in the times of collapse of their multinational states.

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